By Park Song-wu

Former Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu speaks in an interview with The Korea Times at his office in Seoul, Tuesday. / Korea Times Photo by Lee Jin-woo

Former Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu said on Tuesday that North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-il had a "three-stage roadmap" in 2000 to hold summit meetings not only with former President Kim Dae-jung but also with former U.S. President Bill Clinton. During the first inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang in June 2000, Kim Jong-il promised to hold the second summit in Seoul. But he wanted to have a meeting with Clinton first, Park told The Korea Times at his office in Seoul.

Park, Kyungnam University president, said North Korean Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok’s visit to Washington in October 2000 and the following visit to Pyongyang by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were mainly designed to arrange a meeting between Clinton and Kim Jong-il.

But unfortunately Kim did not hurry the plan probably believing that Clinton’s days were numbered and he could get more pricey gifts from the next U.S. administration, which he predicted would be led by then Vice President Al Gore, Park said.

"The North Korean leaders felt great regret at losing the chance (of enhancing the U.S.-North Korea relations) at that time," Park said.

As for a second inter-Korean summit, Park said the North can positively react to Seoul’s proposal as a way to find a breakthrough, if it fails to make any headway in its relations with Washington.

He said there has been no sign of instability in the North even though many people are predicting a sudden collapse of the communist regime because of intensifying pressure from the U.N. Security Council.

Park predicted that the North would choose a collective leadership system in the post-Kim Jong-il era. ``In such a scenario, it may not be implausible for one of Kim’s sons to be chosen as nominal leader,’’ he said.

Park said many people consider Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son of Kim Jong-il, an outcast, but Jong-nam is still considered a possible successor, given that he is currently playing an important role in collecting information, especially on the IT industry, in Asian and European countries.

The following are questions and answers of a written interview with Park Jae-kyu conducted earlier:

2nd Summit Needs Consensus

Q: Do you think it is necessary to hold the second inter-Korean summit? If so, what are the conditions to be met before the summit to be held?

A: A summit meeting or a dispatch of a special envoy to the North is surely a useful tool in the development of inter-Korean relations.

When the first summit took place in 2000, I heard that Pyongyang had a three-stage roadmap of its own _ first, an inter-Korean summit for the reconciliation of the two Koreas; second, a U.S.-North Korea summit to improve bilateral ties; and third, a second inter-Korean summit to upgrade cross-border relations.

The implementation of the second phase of the roadmap is still a long way off. So I think it will be possible to consider hosting the second inter-Korean summit after some progress has been made on the nuclear issue and in Washington-Pyongyang relations.

The North can, however, positively react to Seoul’s proposal for a second summit as a way to find a breakthrough, if it fails to make any headway in its relations with Washington. Since the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il promised to make a "return visit" in June 2000, the second summit is actually long overdue.

Seoul is a good place to host the second summit, but I think the venue should not be a stumbling block. In my opinion, the first half of 2007 will be the best time to hold it.

But I think the most important thing for us is to go through with a consensus-building process in a transparent manner first. We should keep in mind that the presidential election is scheduled to be held later this year.

No Signs of Instability in North

Q: Many North Korea experts talk about the possibility of the North’s regime collapse. Would you tell us your opinion about such possibility?

A: Even though such a possibility has been mentioned frequently ever since the North’s nuclear test and the subsequent sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council on Pyongyang, there has been no signs of instability in the North. I heard that the U.S. intelligence community also has reached the same conclusion.

Gen. B.B. Bell, who heads the U.S. forces in South Korea and the Combined Forces Command, put it this way: "given their record over 53 years since the end of the Korean War, and given what we’ve seen of this centralized government which uses the majority of its economic energy to feed, house, clothe and supply its military, and as long as it has adequate internal and external resources coming to it, I would not predict an immediate collapse of the government."

The North Korean system is accustomed to austerity. The military is still in good shape and the Pyongyang leadership has strong forces to protect itself. Lack of civil society prevents people’s discontent from triggering social unrest.

The North’s sudden collapse is not a desirable event for South Korea because it could threaten peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and impose an astronomical financial burden on South Korea. So I think it is important to continue inducing the North to reform itself in a gradual manner.

2 Sons Trained As Leader

Q: What is your opinion about the "post-Kim Jong-il" leadership system in the North?

A: Currently, nobody in the North publicly talks about who will become the next leader because Kim recently issued a gag order on the successor issue. But I heard that Kim is quietly training his eldest and second eldest son as candidates to succeed him.

I am inclined to believe, however, that it will be difficult for Kim to transfer power to one of his sons since China and Russia would not welcome the perpetuation of a hereditary monarchical system in the putatively socialist North.

Opposition from, or discreet discouragement by, China, the only country with which North Korea has a mutual defense treaty as well as being the principal source of energy and food aid for the beleaguered regime, will serve as a potent deterrent to such a scheme.

I think it is highly probable that should an accident occur that leads to the incapacitation or demise of the supreme leader, the North will choose collective leadership. In such a scenario, it may not be implausible for one of Kim’s sons to be chosen as nominal leader.

Obviously, the lack of reliable information makes all this an idle exercise in speculation. What is indisputable, nonetheless, is that how the political succession unfolds in the post-Kim Jong-il North will affect not only our compatriots there but the shape of inter-Korean relations and, ultimately, the future of the Korean Peninsula as well.

Flexibility Can Find Breakthrough

Q: Would you tell us your opinion on the prospect of the six-party talks?

A: The resumption of six-party talks last December was a most welcome development because it raised the hope that measurable progress might be made in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue.

The goal of all the parties _ except North Korea as it became painfully clear _ was to reach a consensus on the implementation of the agreement reached in September 2006, in which the North pledged to dismantle its nuclear programs and weapons in exchange for security assurance, economic and energy assistance, normalization of relations with the United States and Japan and other benefits.

To our dismay, however, the talks ended in an impasse anew, with no agreement of any kind, not even on the date of the next meeting. If there was a gain, no matter how small, however, it was the confirmation of the utmost priority the North placed on the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue.

The freezing of North Korean accounts in that bank valued at $24 million following the U.S. Treasury Department’s blacklisting of BDA on suspicion of having aided the North in money laundering and circulation of counterfeit U.S. currency seems to have dealt a severe blow to Pyongyang.

In addition to the loss of access to the money involved, the U.S. sanctions led to a virtual isolation of North Korea in international financial transactions.

In order to induce the North to return to the Beijing talks, the United States had agreed to hold bilateral talks with the North on the BDA issue in conjunction with the six-party talks.

As things turned out, the BDA talks proved to be the primary, not an auxiliary, arena, for the North refused to engage in substantive discussions on the nuclear issue either in the plenary session of the six-party talks or in four sessions of bilateral talks that were held on the sidelines between the chief delegates of Washington and Pyongyang. The North insisted on the lifting of sanctions as a precondition for such discussions.

The United States reportedly offered to remove North Korea from the U.S. State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism _ which would pave the way for Pyongyang to join such international financial institutions as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank and become eligible for low-interest, long-term loans _ but since all the inducements were contingent upon the North’s taking concrete steps to freeze and then dismantle its nuclear programs and weapons, Pyongyang showed no interest in the U.S. offer.

The hard line displayed by the North in Beijing last month was fueled by its perception that the Oct. 9 nuclear test had vastly strengthened its ``nuclear deterrent’’ as well as bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the U.S.

Given its past behavior, the North is exceedingly unlikely to soften its stance without getting significant concessions from the United States. That is to say, both sides need to show more flexibility than they have thus far if the impasse is to be broken.

North Wants Right Price for Nuke

Q: Would you tell us whether the North’s nuclear test is designed to declare itself a nuclear power or to enhance its stake at the negotiating table?

A: North Korea’s rhetoric sometimes reflects its real thinking. Its declaration that the nuclear test was designed to serve as a confirmation of its nuclear deterrent is a case in point.

Although the United States may have seriously considered the option of a pre-emptive strike against North Korea’s nuclear installations, that option clearly has become no longer viable.

The North’s bargaining power has also grown, even though not as much as it may hope. As noted, the urgency of denuclearizing the North has become far more pressing.

I believe that the North will eventually give up its nuclear programs for the right price. The North will drive a hard bargain. An increase in mutual trust between Pyongyang and Washington is prerequisite to the forging of a package that will be acceptable to all sides.

(Korea Times, January 2, 2007)